Reason is not a Faculty
Leading a life guided by reason ("ex ductu rationis vivere", 4p46) and being a free person ("homo liber", 4p67) are possibilities that Spinoza treats in the second half of the fourth part of his Ethics under the heading "On Human Bondage". A life of human bondage is primarily determined by emotions of distress. Such a life is not necessary, even though distress is something that cannot be avoided (4p2&4). A human life needn't be characterized throughout by the lack of freedom; one can also lead a life of reason. Emotions still play a role in a reasonable life, but, insofar as they can be divided into active and passive emotions (3d3), the ones that can be characterized as actions predominate.
Perhaps the most remarkable statement Spinoza makes regarding the relation between an unfree, distressful life and a reasonable, free one is to be found in Proposition 59 of the fourth part of the Ethics:
To every action (actiones) to which we are determined from an affect which is passion, we can be determined by reason (a ratione), without that affect. Does this mean that committing a murder, for instance, can be an act of reason? Can all acts that occur be reconstructed as reasonable ones? It would seem that such a reading of Spinoza's text would reduce the difference between a distressful, unfree life and a free life guided by reason to a difference in description and 'emotional attendant circumstances'. In Spinoza's view, every act occurs out of necessity: he does not admit chance occurrences or events resulting from acts of the will (2p48&49, 3p2s). If an act is accompanied by an emotion of distress-a feeling of hatred, for instance, in the case of a murder-it is not grounded in reason; if it is done because of an insight, which is an activity, it is. But if everything that happens to us out of necessity is caused by distress from one perspective and by reason from another, then are not the real and the reasonable the same already for Spinoza, as they are later for Hegel? But what does 'on the basis of ' an emotion or 'grounded in' reason mean here? What does "determined from" (determinatur) mean in this connection (in 4p59)?
Spinoza does not claim that in a reasonable or in an unreasonable life mental faculties act upon persons the way forces do. He does not imagine a faculty of rationality and a faculty of emotionality pitted against each other like boxers in a ring, an act or a life being reasonable or unreasonable depending upon which gains the upper hand. Such a psychology of mental faculties is not a position defended by Spinoza.
1 He does not consider reason and sensibility to be mental forces that act upon individuals that are conceivable independently of the same. For Spinoza, living according to reason means the same thing as acting virtuously, and that in turn means the same thing as preserving one's own being (4p24, 4p37s1). People who are determined by emotions of distress are failing to act exclusively in the interest of their self-preservation; people whose lives are guided by reason succeed for the most part in promoting their own being. A suffering sensibility is nothing but a symptom of unsuccessful self-preservation, a manifestation of powerlessness; whereas active emotions are the way it feels to preserve one's being successfully, to be in the possession of power or to increase one's own potentia agendi. That is the meaning of determinatur and e ratione in this connection. The being which an individual is supposed to try to preserve is, however, considered by Spinoza to be something particular. How is this to be understood? That is a more difficult question.
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In the following, I shall attempt to answer this question by approaching it from two angles. First, I explain the concepts of an individual law, an individual essence, and the notion of an individual reason. I then draw on the idea of an individual's eternal essence, an idea which figures above all in the fourth part of the Ethics. From there I proceed, on the one hand, to a concrete discussion of a life guided by reason with respect to individual emotions and, on the other, to a reconsideration of the question whether every emotional act can also be determined by reason.
